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Abstract:  The Nigerian corporate environment has the potentials for high information 
asymmetry and less disclosure due to the weak institutional structure and an 
ineffective market for corporate control. These instances may undermine the 
monitoring capacity of independent directors in the boardroom. Thus, signifying 
the need for a complementary corporate governance mechanism to boost 
investors’ confidence. This research views that institutional investors have the 
incentives to strengthen board governance, given their sophisticated financial 
expertise and management skill. Therefore, this paper measures the moderating 
role of institutional ownership on the relationship between board independence 
and firms’ capital structure. The study analysed the balanced panel data of 56 
Nigerian non-financial listed companies for seven years (2012-2018) using the 
random effects technique. This study presents evidence that higher levels of 
institutional ownership strengthen the effect of board independence on the 
firms’ leverage and vice versa. Hence, the result implies that managers may face 
stringent monitoring when institutional investors and independent directors 
interact. Such superior monitoring may compel managers to take on higher 
leverage to boost firm’ value. Our finding has an important policy implication 
on enhancing sound corporate governance practices, particularly for firms 
operating in developing countries where the market for corporate control is 
ineffective. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between board independence and capital structure emanates from the 
predictions of the agency and resource dependency theories. These frameworks argue that 
independent outside directors promote board of directors’ monitoring role, reduces 
information asymmetry, which in turn enhances the ability of firms to secure a substantial 
amount of debt capital to boost firms’ value (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; 
Tarus & Ayabei, 2016). Accordingly, some studies emphasise that firms with a higher 
proportion of independent directors on their boards are associated with a levered capital 
structure (Abor, 2007; Jaradat, 2015). On the contrary, a stream of the literature suggests that 
the presence of independent outside directors raises firms’ stock market prices, presumably 
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due to the reputations and expertise of these directors. As such, companies with a substantial 
number of outside directors rebalance their capital structures with more of equity because of 
the improved stock market price. This instance leads to the prediction that the supply of 
leverage decreases as the ratio of outside directors on boards rises (Dimitropoulos, 2014; 
Kyriazopoulos, 2017; Wen, Rwegasira, & Bilderbeek, 2002). 
Interestingly, this research focuses on the Nigerian corporate environment because of its 
unique institutional structure that has implication on corporate governance practices.  First of 
all, based on the ranking released in the year 2020 by the world bank, Nigeria served as the 
largest economy in the African continent. It has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $448.12 
billion in the year 2019, which placed the country ahead of South Africa and Egypt with an 
estimated GDP value of $351.432 and $303.175 billion respectively (World Bank, 2020). 
This estimate may serve as a guide to potential investors in channelling their investable funds 
into the region. Thus, Nigeria may be of keen interest to these investors given that the 
literature has establishes a link between GDP growth and the inflow of foreign direct 
investment to the developing economies (Iamsiraroj, 2016; Mottaleb & Kalirajan, 2010). 
More importantly, the corporate governance framework guiding the conduct of companies in 
Nigeria contains a provision suggesting that all the listed firms in the country should have at 
least one independent director on their boards. This is for the purpose of enhancing high 
disclosure and transparency in firms’ governance in the country.  
However, the firms operating in Nigeria face acute shortage of leverage to finance their 
investment opportunities. In this regard, empirical evidence by Ibhagui and Olokoyo (2018) 
and Sani, Alifiah and Dikko (2020) report that short-term debt constitutes a significant 
fraction of the capital structure of Nigerian listed firms. Consequently, heavy reliance on 
short-term debt may cause severe financial instability to such companies if eventually, 
creditors become unwilling to roll-over such debts. The inability of the firms to secure a 
considerable amount of borrowings has been attributed to the prevailing condition of the 
Nigerian capital market.  The market is associated with high transaction costs, low liquidity 
position and high information asymmetry, and also there is a crowding-out effect of corporate 
borrowings (Ahmad and Fatima, 2017). As a result, the Nigerian listed firms mostly borrow 
from private banks to finance their operations. More often, these commercial banks prefer to 
lend their funds on a short-term basis due to the high information asymmetric associated with 
long-term borrowing (Ibhagui & Olokoyo, 2018; Oino & Ukaegbu, 2015). 
 Likewise, the Nigerian corporate environment possesses high information asymmetry 
due to the weak institutional structure and the ineffective market for corporate control 
(Abdullahi, Ishak, & Sawandi, 2018; Chijoke-Mgbame & Mgbame, 2018; Odeleye, 2018). 
This market constraint and institutional deficiencies may weaken the monitoring role of 
independent directors in Nigeria. Hence, suggesting the need for complementary corporate 
governance mechanism. According to agency literature, in an environment where the market 
for corporate control and institutional frameworks are ineffective or absent, controlling the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers rest with the corporate ownership (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Although the existing literature unveils different forms of 
corporate ownership, agency theory declares that institutional ownership is relatively more 
active than the other types of corporate ownership. Thus, the monitoring capacity of these 
investors is distinct due to their professional knowledge, financial expertise and management 
skills (Alvarez, Jara, & Pombo, 2018; Gillan & Starks, 2000). Example of institutional 
investors includes banks, insurance firms, mutual funds and pension funds. 
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Accordingly, Institutional investors are becoming a vital organ in firms’ financing 
decisions due to their active role in the Nigerian capital market (Ozo & Arun, 2019; Uche, 
Adegbite, & Jones, 2016). They invest in short-term and long-term securities traded on the 
Nigerian equity and debt markets. Therefore, this article measures the moderating role of 
institutional ownership on the relationship between board independence and capital structure 
of the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. Past studies in Nigeria on this subject matter 
dwelled more on examining a direct effect and also have a limited scope (Abdul-Qadir, 
Yaroson, & Abdu, 2015; Ganiyu & Yisau, 2012; Kajola, Olabisi, & Fapetu, 2019). To 
address this gap, this study employs a moderation analysis and a relatively exploit large 
sample size to extend the existing literature. 
Consequently, empirical evidence from this research shows that the interaction between 
board independence and institutional ownership yields a positive and significant coefficient. 
Thus, indicating that institutional monitoring strengthens the effect of independent directors 
on the firms’ leverage. Specifically, the evidence demonstrates that this interaction may serve 
as a viable corporate governance mechanism that can minimise the agency cost of debt and 
thereby increasing the supply of borrowings.  
The rest part of this paper proceeds as follows; the second section covers a literature 
review and hypotheses development. Section three explains the research methodology, while 
part four displays the empirical results and discussions. Lastly, section five contains the 
concluding remarks.    
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The agency theory focused on how the separation between risk-bearing and decision-making 
functions in organisations leads to agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As a result of this separation, the management of firms’ 
resources is vested under the control of decision agents, often referred to as firms’ managers. 
Given this, this theory assumed that managers might often act in contrary to the shareholders’ 
best interests. Therefore, the agency framework suggested that companies should set up a 
board of directors to monitor the actions of firm managers on behalf of the shareholders 
(Muniandy & Hillier, 2015). According to this perspective, the board of directors’ primary 
role is to ratify the policy decisions initiated by top-level management as well as to monitor 
the implementation of such policies.  The literature typically classified directors into internal 
and outside/independent directors (Kesner, 1988). The internal directors are current 
employees of an organisation who are under the control of a chief executive officer (CEO). 
On the other hand, the outside directors are non-executive directors, they are not full-time 
employees of a firm and thus are not under the control of management.   
Specifically, the agency theorist emphasised that corporate boards should be composed 
with a higher number of independent /outside directors. These types of directors have the 
incentives to monitor managers diligently due to their independence and expertise. They 
serve as professional referees who can objectively evaluate and scrutinise the actions of 
firms’ managers to ensure that shareholders’ interest is protected (Bathala & Rao, 1995). In 
addition, most independent directors of firms are either executive directors in other 
companies, and they may also possess expertise in law or finance. Thus, these directors may 
provide crucial support to the managers of the companies they sit as outside directors in 
resolving specialised decisions problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In sum, according to the 
agency viewpoint, the presence of independent directors on corporate boards may enrich the 
board of directors’ decisions quality and thereby enhancing firms’ internal governance 
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system. In effect, this improved governance system due to the presence of outside board 
members has a bearing on the firms’ ability to secure external funding to raise their 
profitability level.  
On the other hand, the resource dependency theory also provided some explanations on 
the impact of board independence on firms’ capital structure choices. The resource 
dependence framework argued that the board of directors’ primary function is to provide 
companies with counsel, legitimacy and advice (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). In 
particular, outside directors are hired purposely to serve on corporate boards because of their 
expertise, acceptance, and skills. More importantly, independent or outside directors often 
assist firms in securing finances at favourable terms from their external constituencies (Gales 
& Kesner, 1994; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Also, firms can obtain legitimacy by appointing 
individuals with recognition and exceptional capability on their boards to secure wider 
acceptance and community support (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In a nutshell, the resources 
dependency approach looked at how independent directors link companies to strategic 
resources that they require for their growth and development. Hence, the theory believed that 
firms with a substantial number of external board members might have a greater chance of 
reducing uncertainties of obtaining future finances. 
Consistent with the above theoretical arguments, empirical studies showed that  board 
independence and capital structure measured by total debt ratio are positively associated (See, 
Abor, 2007; Jaradat, 2015; Tarus & Ayabei, 2016). On the contrary, a stream of the literature 
found that firms’ total debt ratio decreases as the proportion of external directors on corporate 
boards rise (Dimitropoulos, 2014; Kyriazopoulos, 2017; Wen et al., 2002).  Given these 
findings and the theoretical predictions, this study formulated the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: As the number of independent directors rises, the debt ratio in the capital 
structure of Nigerian non-financial listed firms increases. 
 
Additionally, the literature justified that institutional ownership impacts strongly on the 
firms’ financing choices. In this regard, the agency theory stressed the significance of 
corporate ownership in shaping policies and mitigating the failure of internal control in 
organisations (Jensen, 1993). Notably, this perspective emphasised that institutional 
ownership has a substantial impact on strengthening corporate governance best practices. 
Institutional investors serve as a monitor for management policies and also assist in ensuring 
the effective functioning of corporate boards. Therefore, firms with a higher proportion of 
institutional shareholding are associated with more debts in their capital structure to limit 
managerial discretion. Similarly, Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) reported that institutional 
investors with closely held stocks have a higher power to override the decision process 
through their representation on the board of directors. In support of this submission, studies 
by Dimitropoulos (2014), Sun, Ding, Michael and Li (2015) and Uddin, Khan and Hosen 
(2019) found a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and total 
debt. This positive effect of institutional ownership on financial leverage supported the 
argument that institutional shareholders can neutralise the entrenchment behaviour of 
managers due to their stringent monitoring strategies. Such effective monitoring would 
constraint managers to employ high debt level to enhance shareholders’ wealth.  
Similarly, institutional shareholders can directly monitor the CEO and his management 
team because they have the incentives to influence various decisions at board level through  
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the seats they occupy. According to Mallin (2012) and Wang and Shailer (2018), institutional 
shareholders influence decisions of the companies they invested in, through dialogue with 
management or with their voting power. Moreover, empirical evidence showed that firms 
with concentrated institutional ownership experienced a dramatic improvement in their policy 
initiatives and decisions. Accordingly, studies by Erenburg et al. (2016)  and Ma (2019) 
argued that the active and diligent supervision of CEOs and executive directors by 
institutional shareholders assist investee firms in gaining better financial performance. Given 
this review, one may notice that superior monitoring from institutional investors may 
influence firms to adopt more levered capital structure to boost firms’ value. In this way, this 
article predicted that the presence of institutional shareholders might encourage the Nigerian 
non-financial listed firms to employ a substantial proportion of debt when designing their 
capital structures. Hence, we developed the following hypotheses: 
 
H2: Institutional ownership is positively associated with the leverage ratio of 
Nigerian non-financial listed companies. 
H3: Institutional ownership positively influences the relationship between board 
independence and debt ratio of Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
 
Moreover, this paper designed a conceptual framework based on the hypotheses 
developed to enable us to comprehend the focus of the present study. As shown by Figure 1, 
hypothesis one (H1) measured the direct relationship between board independence and 
capital structure measured by total debt, and we expect this relationship to be positive. Also, 
hypothesis two (H2) tested the effect of institutional ownership on the firms’ capital structure, 
and this effect also is assumed to be positive. Lastly, hypothesis three (H3) examined the 
moderating effect of institutional ownership on the relationship between board independence 
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Return on Assets (ROA)
 
Figure I: Research Framework 
 
3.  Research Methodology 
3.1  Data Source and Sampling  
This study generated its data from the annual reports and account of the sampled firms 
covering the period from 2012-2018. Thus, the research utilised the secondary source of data 
collection. Also, the paper designed its sample data in the following manner. We 
concentrated on non-financial listed companies because the financial firms are subjected to 
different regulation and a unique financial reporting framework.  Hence, the capital structure 
composition of financial institutions is substantially different (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Since 
this study measured capital structure using a debt ratio, we focused on firms that disclosed 
borrowed capital in their financial statements. Finally, for us to have complete data for our 
analysis, this research dropped companies with missing data within the period under review. 
Consequently, the final sample of this study consists of a balanced panel data set of 56 
Nigerian non-financial listed companies. 
 
3.2 Study Variables and Measurement 
Moreover, regarding the study variables, our primary explanatory variable is board 
independence. This study measured board independence as the number of independent 
directors over the total number of board members.  Based on the assumptions of the agency 
and resource dependency theories,  firms with a substantial number of external board 
members may have a greater chance of securing external borrowing at favourable terms 
(Abor, 2007; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Perhaps due to the reputation and connections of these 
independent board members. Also, in this research, the capital structure represents the 
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total assets. Empirical studies emphasised that measuring debt using book value is more 
consistent and reliable in decision making because book value is relatively insensitive to 
price fluctuations (Cassar & Holmes, 2003). Besides that, Graham and Harvey (2001) 
reported that managers focus mainly on book values when setting their capital structure.  
In addition, institutional ownership served as the moderating variable in this study. 
Institutional investors have diverse monitoring mechanisms at their disposal, and thus, their 
presence in firms may promote sound corporate governance practice. This article measured 
institutional ownership as the percentage of equity shares owned by institutions such as 
banks, insurance companies, investment funds and pensions organisations. The choice of this 
measurement stemmed from the fact that equity ownership confers a voting power to 
shareholders (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Fosberg, 2004).  Hence, this study believed that 
institutional investors’ moderating effect increases as their equity ownership rises.  
Moreover, to minimise specification bias and also to empower our regression models, we 
employed board size, firm size, tangibility and return on assets as control variables. We 
quantified board size as the number of board members. However, the extant literature showed 
contradictory view regarding the effect of board size on firms’ financing choices. In this 
context, resource dependency theory argued that there is a positive relationship between 
board size and board diversity. Hence, companies are encouraged to set-up large boards to 
enable them to attract diverse resources and expertise from the board composition (Al-
Bassam, Ntim, Opong, & Downs, 2018; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). On the other hand, 
agency theory cautioned firms not to have an oversized board of directors because larger 
boards suffer from poor coordination and ineffective monitoring  (Yermack, 1996).  In line 
with the reasoning of the agency literature in this regard, empirical studies by Dimitropoulos 
(2014) and Kyriazopoulos (2017) found a negative relationship between board size and the 
supply of leverage to firms.  
Concerning the effect of firm size on capital structure choices, findings reported that 
larger companies are associated with a higher debt level (Chipeta & Deressa, 2016; Fitzgerald 
& Ryan, 2019).  This evidence reinforces the argument that Large firms are relatively more 
diversified, have various return streams, stable earnings and less vulnerable to bankruptcy 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988). Accordingly, this research measured firm size as the logarithms 
of total assets. Also, prior studies argued that the level of firms’ investment in fixed assets 
(tangibility) might likewise determine their borrowing decisions. In this research, we 
estimated tangibility as the ratio of fixed assets over total assets. Firms with a high proportion 
of tangible assets tend to have higher liquidation value and utilised more debts because they 
are in a better position to provide collaterals (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Also, the possibility 
of assets substitution will be lower in firms with a high level of fixed assets. Therefore, 
lenders will be more willing to supply their credits to companies with a considerable amount 
of investments in tangible assets. Empirical studies showed that there is a positive association 
between tangibility and total debt ratio (Ahmad & Fatima, 2017; Pacheco & Tavares, 2017).   
Furthermore, profitability level may equally explain the variation of leverage among 
firms. Profitability stands as the ratio of net profit before interest and taxes to book value of 
total assets (ROA). This measure of firm profitability appears to be more appropriate for us to 
gauge the tax advantage of debt financing. In this context, the agency theory suggested that 
profitable companies are bound to have free cash flow. Thus, firms with a high profitability 
ratio should take on more debt to control managers-shareholders agency conflicts (Jensen, 
1986). In the same context, Myers (1984) concluded that firms’ profitability level increases 
with financial leverage because interest tax shield benefit accrues to firms as a result of debt 
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financing. However, a stream of the literature emphasised that that profitable firms focus on 
internally generated funds due to asymmetric information costs of external funding (Myers, 
2001).  As such, the debt level in firms’ capital structure decreases as their profitability 
position increases (Julkid & Lau, 2020; Moradi & Paulet, 2019) 
 
3.3: Model Specification 
This study aimed at measuring the moderating effect of institutional ownership on the 
relationship between board independence and capital structure. To achieve this objective, we 
employed the baseline moderation model specified by Fairchild and Mackinnon (2009), 
which is given as: 
Y𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑍𝑖𝑡  +  𝑖𝑡       (1) 
  
Where:  X= the independent variable, Y= the dependent variable, Z= the moderator variable.  
XZ= the product of X and the moderator variable, 𝛽0 = the intercept of the regression 
function, 
β1 = the effect of X (independent variable) on Y (dependent variable), β2 = the effect of Z 
(moderator variable) on Y (dependent Variable), β3 = the effect of XZ (interaction of the 
independent variable and moderator variable   on Y (dependent variable), and  𝑖𝑡 = the error 
term. Therefore, the moderation effect occurs when the coefficient of the interaction term is 
statistically significant (Aguinis, Edwards, & Bradley, 2017). 
  Since this study sampled 56 listed firms across different industries over seven years 
(2012-2018), it is more appropriate for us to use a panel data approach. Given this, we first 
used a Hausman test to determine the proper estimation model between fixed effect and 
random effect. The Hausman test showed an insignificant result (Prob > chi2 =0.3177) and 
thereby suggesting that random effect model is more suitable for this study. Thus, the general 
form of the random effect framework is, as shown in equation two below: 
 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝑖𝑡      (2) 
 
Where: y = dependent variable, α0 is the regression intercept and ω is the composite error 
term which covers cross-sectional and time-series error components. Hence, by substituting 
our study variables into the equation (1) and (2), this research specified regression models (3) 
and (4). The equation (3) tested the direct relationship between board independence and 
capital structure, while equation (4) measured the moderating effect. These equations are 
shown below: 
  𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  1    +  2    +  3    +  4       +  5       +  𝑖𝑡 
 
     (3)          
 
      𝑖𝑡 =        𝛼0  +  1    +  2     +  3      +  4        
+  5       +  6         +  7    +  𝑖𝑡 
 
       (4) 
  
Where: TD = total debt, BI = board independence, BS = board size, FS = firm size, TANG = 
tangibility, ROA = return on assets, IO = institutional ownership and (BI×IO) = interaction 
between board independence and institutional ownership.  
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4.  Empirical Results and Discussion 
This research conducted several diagnostic tests before running the regression analysis in 
order to specify a less biased model. First of all, we tested for the presence of 
multicollinearity using the Varian Inflation Factor (VIF). According to Field (2009), A VIF 
value of 10 indicates the existence of multicollinearity.  The VIF of our variables in this study 
ranged from 1.04 to 1.38 and thereby indicating the absence of multicollinearity. Also, we 
applied the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test to determine whether there is 
heteroscedasticity in our data. The result appeared significant (Prob > F = 0.000), and thus 
exhibiting the presence heteroscedasticity. In this case, one needs to apply a robust regression 
option to obtain a more consistent and efficient result (Hoechle, 2007). Moreover, we still 
employed the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test to confirm further the suitability 
of the random-effects model for our specification. The results appeared significant (Prob > 
chibar2 = 0.000) and hence reinforcing the appropriateness of the use of random effect 
estimation in this research. Accordingly, our presentation and discussion of the empirical 
results are classified into the descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and random effect 
regression results.   
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Div. Min. Max. Observations 
TD 0.2520 0.1226 0.0000 0.8140 392 
BI 0.0802 0.1224 0.0000 0.5560 392 
BS 8.7678 2.4579 4.0000 17.0000 392 
FS 10.1952 0.7720 8.4190 11.9170 392 
TANG 0.4295 0.2338 0.0170 0.8780 392 
ROA 0.0794 0.1164 -0.3100 0.5290 392 
IO 0.1074 0.1513 0.0000 0.7540 392 
TD = total debt, BI = board independence, BS = board size, FS = firm size, 
TANG = tangibility, ROA = return on assets, IO = Institutional ownership. 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistic of the study variables. The variable (TD) stands 
the ratio of total debt over total assets, and its average value is 0.2520. This evidence 
indicates that the total debt represents 25.20% of the total capital that the firms employed. 
Thus, the result suggests that the Nigerian non-financial listed firms rely heavily on equity 
financing in funding their operations. Perhaps, because of the difficulty in securing a 
substantial amount of borrowings from the Nigerian capital market. Also, board 
independence (BI) shows that 8% of the firms' board members are independent directors. The 
board size (BS) of the sampled firms indicates an average of nine members approximately, 
but with a large deviation across the companies. 
According to the statistics, the variable firm size (FS), which is measured as the 
logarithms of the firms’ total assets reveals a minimum and maximum ratio of 8.4190 and 
11.9170, respectively. Tangibility ratio recorded a mean of 0.4295, but with a wide deviation 
across the sampled companies. This evidence implies that on average, intangible assets  
represent about 57.05% of the firms’ assets compositions.  The return on assets (ROA) shows 
that on average, the firms recorded a profitability ratio of 7.5%. This research attributes this 
low profitability level to the inability of the firms to obtain a substantial amount of 
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borrowings, which in turn leading to the lower return on assets. The institutional ownership 
(IO) exhibits a mean of 10.74% and maximum ratio of 75.40%. 
On the other hand, Table 2 below contains the correlation results among our study 
variables. The evidence shows that there is no strong relationship between the explanatory 
variables. Therefore, the result reveals that our model specification is free of the 
multicollinearity problem. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
Variable TD BI BS FS TANG ROA IO VIF 
TD 1.000        
BI -0.122** 1.000      1.08 
BS -0.204*** 0.104** 1.000     1.15 
FS -0.064 0.220*** 0.361*** 1.000    1.27 
TANG 0.285*** -0.202*** -0.063 -0.263*** 1.000   1.12 
ROA -0.634*** 0.063 0.001 0.129** -0.158*** 1.000  1.04 
IO 0.061 -0.100* -0.099* -0.122** 0.094* -0.076 1.000 1.38 
             ***, ** & * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% respectively. 
Notes: TD is the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets, BI is the 
number of independent directors over the total number of board members, BS is the total 
number of board members, SIZE is the logarithms of the total assets, tangibility is the ratio 
of fixed assets over total assets. ROA is the net profit before interest and taxes divided by 
total assets, IO is the percentage of equity shares owned by institutional investors, and 
(BI*IO) is the interaction between board independence and institutional ownership. 
 
Table 3: Random Effects Regression Results 
Model (3) (4) 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Constant 1.2279 0.953 0.7475 0.971 
Board Independence -0.0640* 0.066 -0.1203*** 0.002 
Firm Size 0.0174 0.111 0.0190* 0.078 
Tangibility  0.1283*** 0.000 0.1283*** 0.000 
Return on Assets  -0.5019*** 0.000 -0.5118*** 0.000 
Moderator:     
Institutional 
Ownership 
- - 0.1493** 0.012 
Interaction Term:     
(BI×IO) - - 0.5889*** 0.004 
R-Squared                                                  0.4993                                    0.5103 
Wald statistics                                           253.63                                    266.55 
Prob. >chi2                                                 0.000                                      0.000 
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Year dummies                                              yes                                          yes 
***, ** & * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% respectively. 
Notes: This table shows estimates of equation 3 and 4 for direct relationship 
and moderating and moderating effect, respectively. TD is the book value of 
total debt divided by the book value of total assets, BI is the number of 
independent directors over the total number of board members, BS is the total 
number of board members, SIZE is the logarithms of the total assets, 
tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets over total assets, ROA is the net profit 
before interest and taxes divided by total assets, IO is the percentage of equity 
shares owned by institutional investors, and (BI*IO) is the interaction between 
board independence and institutional ownership. 
 
Table 3 reports the random effects regression results, which is classified into the model 
(3) and (4). Accordingly, model (3) shows the finding on the direct relationship between 
board independence and capital structure. According to the results, board independence has a 
significant negative relationship with total debt ratio at the 10% level. This finding suggests 
that as the number of independent board members rises, the Nigerian non-financial listed 
companies employ a lower debt level. This evidence is consistent with the results found by 
Wen et al. (2002) and Kyriazopoulos (2017). These studies argue that the appointment of 
outside directors is associated with an increase in firms’ stock prices. Perhaps, due to the 
reputation and expertise of such directors. Put differently, top-level managers usually face 
extensive monitoring when independent directors control a corporate board. This improved 
monitoring may reduce the need for high debt level in such firms. In this way, Nigerian non-
financial listed firms with a considerable number of independent directors may pursue a less 
levered capital structure. Thus, leading to the estimated negative relationship between board 
independence and the firms’ total debt ratio. Therefore, in light of the preceding discussion, 
this paper rejects its hypothesis one (H1). Instead, the study suggests that an increase in the 
number of independent directors causes the Nigerian non-financial firms to adopt lower 
leverage in their capital structures.  
Moreover, some of our control variables indicate signs in tandem with the existing 
capital structure theories. Firm size shows a positive but insignificant coefficient and thereby 
demonstrating an insignificant effect in predicting the firms’ financing behaviour. One 
possible explanation for this insignificant association between firm size and total debt ratio is 
that larger companies may be able to resolve information asymmetry with outsiders because 
of their high level of disclosure. Therefore, lower information asymmetry may raise the 
market value of equity stock of such firms, which, in turn, causing Nigerian firms with larger 
size to have more preference for equity financing than debt. Hence, resulting in this estimated 
weak association between leverage ratio and firm size. Also, tangibility demonstrates a 
positive and significant impact on capital structure. This empirical result lends support to the 
argument that firms with a large ratio of tangible assets are in a better position to provide 
collaterals which is a requisite for securing borrowings.  Thus, this positive effect of 
tangibility on leverage implies that Nigerian non-financial with a higher ratio of fixed assets 
rebalance their capital structure with more of debt rather than equity financing. As such, this 
evidence is consistent with the findings that tangibility and firms’ debt ratio are positively 
related (Ahmad & Fatima, 2017; Pacheco & Tavares, 2017). Our regression results likewise 
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exhibit a strong negative association between profitability and total debt ratio as a proxy for 
firms’ capital structure. This evidence reinforces the conclusion that profitable firms with 
sufficient retained earnings attached less preference to the external debt (Julkid & Lau, 2020; 
Moradi & Paulet, 2019). 
Furthermore, the regression results in the model (4) measures the moderating effect. It 
shows how the moderator variable (institutional ownership) influence the dependent variable 
(capital structure). Then again, this model also indicates the results on the effect of the 
interaction between board independence and institutional ownership (BI*IO) on our 
dependent variable. Based on the results in the model (4), institutional ownership 
demonstrates a positive coefficient at the 5% significance level. This evidence is consistent 
with the conjecture that leverage increases as institutional ownership rises (Dimitropoulos, 
2014; Sun et al., 2015; Uddin et al., 2019). Therefore, this finding implies that Nigerian non-
financial listed firms with a higher proportion of institutional shareholding are associated 
with more debts in their capital structure. Given this result, we fail to reject our hypothesis 
(H2).  
Additionally, the coefficient of the interaction term exhibits a significant and positive 
coefficient at the 1% level. The result supports our hypothesis three (H3) that Institutional 
ownership positively moderates the relationship between board independence and debt ratio 
of Nigerian non-financial listed firms. This positive moderation effect reveals that 
institutional ownership strengthens the relationship between board independence and capital 
structure measured by total debt ratio. Hence, the empirical evidence reinforces the argument 
of the agency theory that institutional investors serve as a monitor for management policies 
and also assist in ensuring the effective functioning of corporate boards. Such effective 
monitoring may constraint managers to employ high debt level to enhance shareholders’ 
wealth (Jensen, 1986; Ma, 2019; Wang & Shailer, 2018). Also, the result suggests that 
superior monitoring by institutional investors, coupled with the supervision of independent 
directors may boost the confidence of creditors, which, in turn, leads to the supply of more 
loanable funds. Thus, resulting in the positive moderating effect. The evidence confirms 




This study investigated the moderating effect of institutional ownership on the relationship 
between board independence and capital structure of the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. 
The study analysed the balanced panel data of 56 Nigerian listed companies for seven years 
(2012-2018) using the random effects technique. This study presents evidence that higher 
levels of institutional ownership strengthen the effect of board independence on the firms’ 
leverage and vice versa. Hence, this finding implies that stringent monitoring, coupled with 
the diligent supervision and expertise of the independent directors, may enhance creditors’ 
confidence and thereby leading to the supply of more leverage.  
Furthermore, our analysis in this paper provides new insight into the corporate 
governance literature in the following ways. Firstly, the evidence from this paper 
demonstrated that the interaction between institutional ownership and independent directors 
might serve as a viable corporate governance mechanism that can minimise the agency cost 
of debt and thereby increasing the supply of debt. Likewise, this study contributes to the 
existing studies by providing a fresh perspective on the determinants of firms’ capital 
structure. More importantly, evidence emanating from this research has some implications on 
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the policy decisions of the Nigerian non-financial listed firms. Firms should embrace 
institutional ownership and equally employ a considerable number of independent directors 
on their boards to enable them secure debt capital at favourable terms. In conclusion, it may 
be attractive if future studies should focus on how the interaction between board 
independence and other forms of corporate ownership, such as managerial and foreign 
ownerships may influence firms’ leverage. Likewise, similar studies can be undertaken in 
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